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Article 6

NEWI V. COMMISSIONER: HOME OFFICE DEDUCTIONS
AND EQUAL TREATMENT FOR EMPLOYEES
Over the past decade the Tax Court has repeatedly faced disputes
involving the deduction of employee home expenses under § 162 of the
Internal Revenue Code.' The failure of that court to deal decisively
with the issue has finally been remedied by the Second Circuit in Newi
v. Commissioner.2
George Newi, a salesman of television advertising, used his den
to study each day's selling activities and to view television commercials.
Although Newi was provided with adequate office and television facilities,
he found it more convenient to work at home." Newi took a deduction
for this use of his den. The deduction was disallowed by the Internal
Revenue Service because Newi was not required to work at home as a
condition of his employment. 4 The Tax Court allowed the deduction,'
however, and IRS appealed. The court of appeals found that since
distance and delay made it impractical for Newi to return to his downtown office at night his home office expense was "appropriate and
helpful" 6 and, therefore, deductible under § 162.

§ 162

DEDUCTIONS

7
In order to receive a § 162 deduction a taxpayer must prove
that the expenses claimed were "ordinary and necessary expenses paid
or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
9
business."' That the expense was incurred or that it was of a business

1.

INT. Rxv. CODE of 1954,

§

162.

2. 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970), affg 38 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 735 (1969).
3. 432 F.2d at 999-1000. Record at 48.
4. 432 F.2d at 999-1000.
5. George H. Newi, 38 P.1-1 Tax Ct. Mem. 735 (1969).
6. 432 F.2d at 1000
7. The language of § 162(a) has not been altered since the Revenue Act of
or business
1918, ch. 18 § 214(a) (1), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066. All references to this trade
4
deduction will be to § 162 although the identical provisions of its pre-195 predecessors
will occasionally be involved.
8. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162(a). In contrast to § 162, §§ 262 and 263
render personal and capital expenses nondeductible unless specifically allowed elsewhere in the Code. IRS treats all costs of maintaining a household as nondeductible
under § 262 unless the taxpayer "uses part of the house as his place of business."
Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b) (3) (1958).
9. This requirement insures that a deduction is not allowed for an expense
that was never sustained. Security Flour Mills v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281 (1944).
It further insures that the expense is properly allocable to the taxable year. Lucas v.
American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445 (1930).
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nature' is seldom at issue. In practice, deductibility under § 162 has
turned on the meaning of "ordinary and necessary." 11 The inherent
flexibility of this phrase has provided courts with wide discretion to
limit or expand the coverage of § 162 in accordance with the policy
considerations deemed significant in each case. 2
In 1933 the Supreme Court, in Welch v. Helvering,8 defined
"necessary" to mean "appropriate and helpful"14 and "ordinary" to
require that the expense be both noncapital and consistent with normal
business practices. In 1966, however, the Court in Commissioner v.
Tellier redefined "ordinary" so as to require merely that the expense
be noncapital.'0 Following Tellier, therefore, a noncapital expense need
10. The cases interpreting § 162 have used the term "business" intwo distinct
senses--"business in fact" and "business at law.'" "Business in fact" is a common
sense definition requiring that the activity involved not be a hobby or some other
strictly personal endeavor. See, e.g., Celeste B. Smith, P-H TAX CT. REP. & ME.
DEc. ff 71,122 (May 27, 1971); James E. Ashe, 36 P-H Tax Ct. Menr. 862 (1967).
"Business at law," however, is not a requirement for deductibility. It is, rather, a
shorthand expression of a court's overall decision concerning deductibility, expressed in
terms of proximate relationship to business. "Business" in this second sense is really
equivalent to "ordinary and necessary." See notes 11-12 infra.
11. Given the business of the particular taxpayer . . . the real problem
lies in the taxpayer's attempt to connect . . . [his permissible deductions
with his actual expenses] . . . What sort of legalistic wiring will close the
circuit... ?
Boehm, "Ordinary and Necessary Expenses": Proximate Relationship as a Rejuvenated
Test for Deductibility, 30 U. CiN. L. REv. 1,6 (1961).
12. In a manner reminiscent of the tort concept of proximate cause courts have
used "ordinary and /necessary" as a tool for limiting the deductibility of expenses
which are actually incurred in the taxpayer's business so as to effectuate the courts'
policy preferences. In interpreting the cases in this manner, Boehm argues that the
courts are legitimately, although not always expressly, using "ordinary and necessary" to
narrow § 162 so as to deny a deduction for extravagant expenses. In so doing, according
to Boehm, the courts have referred to such expenses as not proximately caused by
business, as not proximately related to business, or as too remote. Id. See, e.g., Lykes
v. United States, 343 U.S. 118, 128 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ; Bingham's Trust
v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 370 (1945); Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S.
467, 470-71 (1943); Deputy v. DuPont, '308 U.S. 488, 493-94 (1940); Kornhauser
v. United States, 276 U.S. 145, 153 (1928); H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
75 (1942) ; S.REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1942).
13. 290U.S. 111 (1933).
14. Despite the widely divergent interpretations of the terms "ordinary and
necessary" in combination, there is general agreement as to the correct interpretation of the word "necessary" standing alone:
We may assume that the payments to creditors of the Welch Company
were necessary for the development of the petitioner's business, at least
in the sense that they were appropriate and helpful. . . . He certainly thought
they were, and we should be slow to override his judgment.
Id. at 113; accord, Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966); Commissioner v..
Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
The expenses incurred by the taxpayer in an unsuccess-15. 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
ful defense against criminal charges of securities and mail fraud -were allowed as.
business deductions.
16. The principle function of the term "ordinary" in § 162(a) is to clarify
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only be "appropriate and helpful" to satisfy the "ordinary and necessary"
language of § 162.
TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEES UNDER §

162

Section 162 makes no distinction between employees and selfemployed taxpayers. judicial interpretation of the section has created
such a distinction. The federal tax was originally intended to be a levy
on net income,' 7 but early courts balked at granting employee business
deductions. Consonant with this prejudice, the courts utilized a whipsaw
test based upon an employer benefit theory to defeat employee business
deductions. On the one hand, the courts reasoned, if the employee's
expense benefited the employer's business, the expense was the employer's.
On the other hand, the expense was held to be personal and non-deductible
the distinction, often difficult, between those expenses that are currently
deductible and those that are in the nature of capital expenditures, which,
if deductible at all, must be amortized over the useful life of the asset.
Id. at 689-90.
17. Although the federal tax is actually levied on an amount which is more
than net income, the allowance of business deductions is essentially an attempt to
achieve a tax base approximating net income. In 1913, during the Senate debate
over the wording of the business expense deduction provisions of the first income
tax act under the sixteenth amendment, Senator John Sharp Williams (D.-Miss.),
the floor manager of the bill, explained the business expense section as an attempt
to define net income:
The object of this bill is to tax a man's net income; that is to say,
what he has at the end of the year after deducting from his receipts his
expenditures and losses. It is not to reform men's moral characters;
that is not the object of the bill at all . . . the tax is framed for the purpose
of making a man pay upon his net income, his actual profit during the year.
50 CONG. REc. 3849 (1913).
This principle has since been honored more in the breach than in the observance.
With the advent of World War I and higher tax rates, violation of this net income
principle became particularly severe:
The sum and substance of it all is that you can pay a 2 per cent tax
out of an income which you are supposed to have but have not, but if you
are to pay a 50 per cent tax you have got to have the income out of which
to pay it. Although originally when we were dealing with lower rates of
taxes there was something to be said for the viewpoint that the Government's
expected revenue should not be reduced by outside transactions, some of which
have been characterized as gambling, the practical force of this viewpoint is
entirely overcome when we are seeking to collect very high taxes out of an
income which does not in fact exist. We are in a situation now where the
Government can get a very heavy revenue out of actual incomes and where
it is not only unnecessary but unjust to seek a revenue out of a theoretical
and nonexistant [sic] income-whatever may be the cause of its nonexistence.
Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1918 before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
65th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 243 (1918).
While the situation may be somewhat less severe today, the principle remains
that to tax more than net income is to tax nonexistent income. The importance of
this theory lies in its continuing attractiveness to equitable instincts. The movement
towards a liberalized definition of "ordinary and necessary" is at its core a movement
toward this goal.
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if not of benefit to the employer's enterprise."
9
In 1938, with the decision in Schmidlapp v. Commissioner,"
the
Second Circuit rejected this whipsaw approach and permitted a bank
executive to deduct the costs of entertaining his employer's customers.
Speaking for the court, Judge Learned Hand reasoned:

It is no answer to say that [the expenses] were for the bank's
benefit; so were all the taxpayers services; if it did in fact give
him to understand that he was to extend a factitious hospitality
in its interest, the cost of it was a necessary expense of his
office.2
Relying on Schlmidlapp, subsequent decisions abandoned the notion that
wage earners could not deduct § 162 expenses."
Nevertheless, vestiges of the previous bias against wage earners
still remained. Employees were subjected to more rigorous standards of
proof than those imposed upon self-employed taxpayers. At the core of
this discrimination was a revised employer-benefit rule. Cases following
Schmidlapp theorized that employee expenses were personal and nondeductible if not of benefit to the taxpayer's employer.2 2 However, the
expenses benefiting an employer were deductible by the employee if all
other § 162 requirements were satisfied. In making proof of employer18. This principle was adopted by a series of cases in the 1920's and early 1930's.
Franklin M. Magill, 4 B.T.A. 272 (1926); Arthur B. Chivers, 4 B.T.A. 1083 (1926);
E. S. Frischkorn, 7 B.T.A. 431 (1927); Hal E. Roach, 20 B.T.A. 919 (1930); Carl
J. Schmidlapp, P-H B.T.A. Mem. 542, rev'd, 96 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1938). See also
Lempert, Who Can Deduct a Business Expense, 11 TAx L. REv. 433 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Lempert] ; Osmond, The Corporate Executive and the Business Expense
Deduction, 33 TAXES 68 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Osmond]; Rothschild & Sobernheim, Expense Accounts for Executives, 67 YAL LJ. 1363 (1958) ; Note, Deductibility
of Expenses Incurred for the Benefit of Another, 66 Hagv. L. Rx-v. 1508 (1953)
[hereinafter cited as Deductibility of Expenses].
19. 96 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1938).
20. Id. at 682.
21. "[E]very person who works for compensation is engaged in the business
of earning his pay. . .

."

Noland v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 108, 111 (4th Cir. 1959),

cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959). See also Trent v. Commissioner, 291 F.2d 669
(2d Cir. 1961) ; Caruso v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 88 (D.N.J. 1964).
The pre-Schmidlapp whipsaw test continues to have application as a device to
prevent deduction shifting. Thus stockholders may not deduct unreimbursed expenses
of benefit to the business. Noland v. Commissioner, supra. In addition, executives who
voluntarily forego reimbursement may not deduct the expenses that would have been
reimbursed. Heidt v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1959).
22. The fact that the expenditure is for the employer's primary benefit does
not lessen deductibility; rather it is only because the employer expects the
expenditure that it is a business one. . . .
Deductibility of Expenses, supra note 18, at 1509. Accord, Lempert, supra note 18, at
436; Osmond, supra note 18.

'.550
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benefit a prerequisite to deductibility, courts required a showing of that
which had previously precluded a § 162 deduction.
Three standards for the application of the employer-benefit rule
emerged. Section 162 expenses were deductible if: (1) the employee
was required or expected to incur the expense as "a condition of his
employment" ;2" (2) the employee's compensation reflected the expense"
or (3) the expense was likely to contribute to the employee's advancement.25
The courts displayed a marked preference for the restrictive "condition of employment" test in the years immediately following Schmidlapp. During the 1950's, however, they developed a greater willingness
to grant deductions upon the satisfaction of any of the tests.26 Nevertheless, in the early 1960's, concern over extravagant expense account
practices returned the "condition of employment" test to prominence. 7
It was at this time the home office deduction became a significant issue.
THE HOME OFFICE DEDUCTION FOR EMPLOYEES

The 1962 decision of Harold H. Davis" represents the first Tax
Court application of the "condition of employment" test to the home
office deduction.2" Davis, a college professor, used a room above his
23. Schmidlapp v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 680, 681 (2d Cir. 1938) ("expected");
A.D. Crews, 21 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 453, 455 (1952) ("required"). Accord, Fred F.
Fischer, 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 456, 461 (1947) ; Andrew jergens, 17 T.C. 806,
811 (1951); Grover Tyler, 13 T.C. 186, 189 (1949). Cf. V.W. Bercaw, 16 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 28, 31 (1947).
24. Harold A. Christensen, 17 T.C. 1456, 1457 (1952); Andrew Jergens, 17
T.C. 806, 811 (1951); Grover Tyler, 13 T.C. 186, 189 (1949).
25. Originally, expenses likely to lead to advancement were treated either as
capital expenses or as personal expenses. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115-16
(1933); I.T. 1520, 1-2 Cum. BULL. 145 (1922). The ruling was reversed by I.T.
2688, XII-1 Cum. BuLL. 251 (1933). Both rulings involved research expenses of
college professors. By 1963, IRS conceded that proof of a relationship between
advancement and research expenditure would render the expenditure deductible. Rev.
Rul. 63-275, 1963-2 Cum. BuLL. 85. See note 41 infra.
26. Harold A. Christensen, 17 T.C. 1456 (1952), represented a breakthrough
in this respect. This case, which was reviewed by the whole court, held that an
employee expense was deductible although it was not incurred as a condition of his
employment. Id. at 1457.
27. Harold H. Davis, 38 T.C. 175 (1962), reflects this concern. Davis was
decided during the height of congressional debate over the Revenue Act of 1962,
Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960, 974 (codified in scattered sections of INT. Ray.
CODE of 1954). Section 4(a) (1) of that Act imposed special substantiation requirements upon travel, entertainment and gift expense deductions.
INT. REV. CODE Of
1954, § 274. This provision fulfilled a campaign promise made by Pres. Kennedy.
Eager to do its part, the Tax Court resurrected the "condition of employment" test
as a screening device to prevent extravagant deductions. The overzealous application
of that test is reflected in Davis.
28. 38 T.C. 175 (1962), vacated, No. 18188 (9th Cir., Jan. 3, 1964).
29. In all but one of the employee home office cases before Davis, the deduction
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garage to prepare lectures, grade exams, perform research and hold
student conferences." While admitting that he was not required by his
employer to use his home, Davis argued that the inadequacy of his
campus office rendered his home office expenses "ordinary and necessary"
within the meaning of § 162."' The Tax Court rejected this argument
and, in dicta, implied that the mere inadequacy of the employer-provided
office would not satisfy the "condition of employment" test." The court
refused to find the expense "necessary" even though Davis' compensation
was partially determined by scholarly writing." In disallowing the
deduction, the court indicated that satisfaction of any standard less than
"condition of employment" would not suffice.3
judge Raum's strong dissent in Davis previewed the subsequent
liberalization of the home office deduction. Speaking for five members of
the court, he accused the majority of distinguishing employees from
other taxpayers.3 He reasoned that Davis' expenses should be deductible
as "ordinary and necessary" since they were "appropriate, in carrying
on his profession as a teacher."3 " Raum insisted that this result should
not differ even if Davis worked at home for his own convenience. 7
was allowed without regard to whether or not the employer required that a home
office be maintained. In Madge H. Evans, 8 P-H B.T.A. Mem. 164 (1939), an
employee-actress was allowed the deduction. Miss Evans used her home to memorize
her lines and for other business-related purposes. In Freda W. Sandrich, 15 P-H Tax
Ct Mem. 236 (1946), a producer-writer-director worked at home and received the
deduction because "The confusion and constant interruptions at the studio made it
impossible to do effective creative work at that place." Id. at 238. Neither Evans' nor
Sandrich's employer required a home office. The deduction was also allowed in
Morris S. Schwartz, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 795 (1961). Schwartz used his home for
research and other activities related to his job as a teacher and a lecturer.
In the only pre-Davis case denying the deduction, an employee improperly took
the deduction in computing adjusted gross income under § 22(n) of the 1939 Code
(§ 62 of 1954 Code) rather than as an itemized deduction in computing taxable income.
Chester C. Hand, 16 T.C. 1410 (1951). Thus, the result in Davis was not supported
by the prior cases.
30. 38 T.C. at 177-80.
31. Id. at 179-80; Record at 95-96; Petitioner's Brief at 3, 50.
32. 38 T.C. at 180.
33. Id. at 176.
34. Id. at 179-80.
35. [W]here the taxpayer is compelled by his employer to incur certain
expenses, that fact itself may be highly pertinent in allowing the deduction.
But the absence of such compulsion certainly does not, of itself, require
the opposite result....
[I]t is important to lay at rest any possible argument that petitioner's
right to deduction must be denied because he was an employee rather than
one who was self-employed. There is nothi;g in the law establishing any
such distinction. If the expenses are "ordinary and necessary," proximately
related to the taxpayer's work, they are deductible.
38 T.C. at 186-87 (emphasis added) (Raum, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 187.
37. Id. at 187-88.
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Six months after Davis the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 62-180,
apparently to restate and solidify the Davis holding:
The burden of proof rests upon the taxpayer to establish (1)
that, as a condition of his employment, he is required to
provide his own space and facilities for performance of some
of his duties. . . .8
The strength of Davis and Revenue Ruling 62-180 was seriously
9
undercut by the Tax Court in Clarence E. Peiss."
On facts nearly
identical to those in Davis, the Peiss court granted the home office
deduction without mentioning Davis, Revenue Ruling 62-180 or the
"condition of employment" test. Peiss allowed the deduction apparently
because the taxpayer's campus office was inadequate for research and his
compensation and advancement were determined by his research productivity."
Peiss may be analyzed as (1) an exception to Revenue Ruling
62-180 limited to researching professors;41 (2) an "inadequate office"
exception to the "condition of employment" test42 or (3) a rejection of
that test. 43 While the vitality of the "condition of employment" test
remained an open question, it was clear that Peiss represented a modification of Davis.
Unfortunately, the Peiss decision did little to resolve the controversy
surrounding the meaning of "ordinary and necessary" in the home office
38. Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 52, 53.
39. 40 T.C. 78 (1963). appeal dismissed, CCH 1964
Case Table,

STAND. FED. TAX REP., 1964
70,838 (7th Cir. 1964), acquiesced in, 1968-2 Cui. BULL. 2.

40. 40 T.C. at 80, 83-84.
41. In an apparent attempt to limit the impact of Peiss, IRS issued a ruling in
1964 which established a college researching exception to the Rev. Rul. 62-180 "condition
of employment" test. According to its terms, the new ruling allowed a college professor
to deduct his home office expenses if he:
has certain duties which encompass . . . the communication and advancement
of knowledge through research and publication . . . [and] . . . [t] he college

does not furnish adequate space and facilities necessary to carry on such
independent research.
Rev. Rul. 64-272, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 55. This ruling was consistent with Rev. Rul.
63-275, 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 85, issued a year earlier, which recognized that "likelihood
of advancement" would be sufficient to satisfy the employer-benefit rule. In the home
office context, however, that ruling and Rev. Rul. 64-272 represented an anomoly.
Employees other than college professors were still supposedly subjected to Rev. Rul.
62- 180's "condition of employment" test and could not have a deduction merely because
the expense made advancement more likely.
42. In light of later cases this interpretation of Peiss seems to be the most accurate
one. See Herman E. Bischoff, 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 603 (1966); Valentine J.
Anzalone, 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 549 (1964).
43. The cases since have undermined this view. See Valentine J. Anzalone, 33 P-H
Tax Ct Mem. 549 (1964).
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context. Subsequent Tax Court decisions further contributed to this
confusion. In Neil M. Kelly," the court, without citing authority, held
that a pilot had failed to prove "necessary" a home office even though he
had no employer-provided office. In Valentine J. Anzalone," the Tax
Court, relying on the "condition of employment" test, denied a home
office deduction to a sales engineer who was provided with an adequate
office. Relying on Peiss, the court in Robert C. McGuire4 permitted a
high school principal the home office deduction for performance of
administrative tasks."' Likewise, in Herman E. Bischoff,"' a commercial
artist was allowed the deduction since his business office was improperly
heated and air-conditioned and, therefore, "undesirable." 9
Kelly and McGuire did little to clarify the vagaries of Peiss, for
neither explained the basis for its outcome. Anzalone, however, demonstrated that Peiss was not a rejection of the "condition of employment" test. In Anzalone, Judge Mulroney (who had decided Peiss)
applied the "condition of employment" test upon a finding that the office
was adequate. Nevertheless, the court in Bischoff relied upon Peiss in
rejecting the "condition of employment" test.5 0 Bischoff's rejection of
that test may have been dictum, however, since the office provided
Bischoff by his employer was inadequate.
The confusion was in no way lessened by Larry N. Kutchinski.5 '
Mrs. Kutchinski, a college typing instructor, prepared lessons and graded
papers at home because she had no business office. The Tax Court
disallowed the deduction since the taxpayer's wife failed to prove that
she had requested and had been denied an office." This finding is
44. 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 521 (1964).
45. 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 549 (1964).
46. 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1286 (1965).
47. McGuire's failure to prove that he used one room exclusively for business was
not fatal to deductibility. The court applied a pro rata formula with both "area* and
"time of use" factors. Id. at 1287.
48. 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 603 (1966).
49. Id. at 604. The court also found that the taxpayer worked more efficiently
at home. Id.
50. We have no doubt that the studio maintained at petitioner's home was
used for business purposes. Although his employer did not specifically require
him to maintain such facility, it certainly was appropriate to the conduct of
his trade or business in the circumstances of this case. Cf. Clarence Peis
40 T.C. 78, 83-84. To be deductible as an ordinary and necessary business
expense, it is sufficient that the expenditure be "appropriate and helpful"
cf. Conm.
to the conduct of the business; it need not be "required"
inissionerv. Tellier. . . .
35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 604. Judge Raum, in Bischoff, was consistent with his
Davis dissent. But despite its strong language, Bischoff accomplished no more than the
establishment of an inadequate office exception.
51. 37 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 247 (1968).
52. Id. at 250.
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particularly questionable, for there was no employer-provided office,
much less an adequate one. Furthermore, it was clear that Mrs. Kutchinski's activities at home were required by her job.5"
NEWI V. COMMISSIONER

Again faced with a case in which the taxpayer was provided an
adequate office, the Tax Court in Newi allowed the deduction. 4 In
upholding this decision, the Second Circuit focused on the taxpayer's
convenience, finding it "wholly impractical" 55 for Newi to return to his
business office in the evenings.5" Both courts explicitly rejected the
Government's argument that the "condition of employment" test and the
adequacy of the employer-provided office precluded deductibility."
This result was based upon the court's application of Tellier to
the home office context." Since Tellier redefined "ordinary" to mean
noncapital, thus eliminating the focus on the business practices of the
taxpayer's employer, the sole criterion for deductibility after Tellier is
the "appropriateness and helpfulness" of the expense to the taxpaying
employee."
This redefinition of "ordinary" and the subtle shift away from
considerations of benefit to employer which it initiated are reflected in
Newi's treatment of employer-benefit as irrelevant.59 Consistent with
53. Id. at 249.
54. 38 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 740.
55. 432 F.2d at 1000.
56. The deduction was allowed because Newi's office was twenty blocks from
his home, a taxi was difficult to obtain during the theater hour and traffic congestion
would cause him to miss some television programs. Id. By way of contrast, the court
characterized Newi's den study as the most appropriate place for him to view television:
It would be hard to imagine a better method than, in the isolation of his
study-den, to view, ponder over and make notes relating to television programs.
Id.
57. 38 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 740; 432 F.2d at 999-1000.
58. See note 16 supra & text accompanying.
59. The Government had argued in the court of appeals that the expense of
providing Newi with an office was deductible only by Newi's employer:
In addition to the fact that the expenses involved are essentially personal
.... ,here the employer assumed the expense of providing adequate facilities
to its employees for the performance of their duties. The facilities were
open and available to the taxpayer even after working hours. There is no
indication that the employer expected the employee to furnish additional
facilities or that the employee's choice to use his own "office" rather than
the employer's had any effect on his salary. While it may have been more
convenient for the employee to work at home, there is no indication that the
outside work itself could not have been performed at the employer's office.
While an employee is considered as being in a trade or business, his trade
or business is not that of the employer . . . . Where the employer undertakes to provide the necessary facilities for proper performance of the
employee's duties and the employee is not expected to provide such facilities,
the expenses of providing work facilities are those of the employer, and
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this position, the court of appeals also considered irrelevant the adequacy
of the employer-provided office." Once the employer-benefit basis of the
"condition of employment" test was eliminated, there remained no need
for an "inadequacy" exception. The Newi court looked through the eyes
of the employee rather than those of the employer in order to determine
the legitimacy of the deduction.
POSSIBLE RAMIFICATIONS OF NEWI
It has traditionally been argued that expansion of employee deductions will result in increased administrative complexity, burdensome
costs and loss of revenue. 6 Appreciating the potential impact of Newi,
the Commissioner argued to the Second Circuit that upholding the Tax
Court
would open the doors for a business deduction to any employee
who would voluntarily choose to engage in an activity at home
which conceivably could be helpful to his employer's business ... 62
The Commissioner's concerns are not without basis. The "condition
of employment" test has provided a convenient administrative screening
the employee cannot convert such expenses into his own business expenses
by assuming the expense thereof. . . .
Appellant's Brief at 12-13 (citations omitted). Despite this argument, neither the
Tax Court nor the Second Circuit made a single reference to the needs of Newi's
employer.
60. 432 F.2d at 999-1000.
61. R. GooDE, THE INDIVIDUAL INcomE TAx 76-98 (1964).
A net income tax should allow the deduction from gross receipts of all
costs of obtaining income. The U.S. tax makes adequate provision for the
deduction of most business costs, as reflected in accounting statements, and
for most costs of obtaining investment income. Provisions are less complete for
deducting costs of earning income as [an] . . .employee.

The 'difficulties arise mainly in connection with items that may combine
consumption and cost elements.
Id. at 76. After discussion of these problem expenses, Goode concludes that the
administrative difficulty of distinguishing between the cost and consumption elements
justifies the stricter standards imposed on employees. Id. at 97, 98.
62. Id. at 1000, quoting Appellant's Brief at 11-12. The court answered:
[T]he Tax Court's construction of "ordinary and necessary" [to mean] "appropriate and helpful" . . . opens the doors just long enough to enable this Taxpayer to pass through it into his cloistered study to pursue his business .
432 F.2d at 1000.
If the court seriously believed that Arewi would be limited to its facts, then
it was a very poor prophet. In a series of five home office cases in 1971, the Tax Court
applied Newi liberally to allow the deduction. See notes 67-69 infra.
63. The old "condition of employment" standard screened out most fraudulent
claims, thus eliminating the need to impeach a taxpayer's testimony as to the actual use
of his home.
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device, allowing IRS to make determinations on the basis of objective
data. The Newi standard, which would require a case-by-case examination
of subjective claims, would result in increased costs of enforcement.
'Without the "condition of employment" test IRS faces the impossible
task of impeaching fraudulent deductions for expenses incurred in the
privacy of the home. 3 Consequently, if a taxpayer proves the costs of
maintaining an office at home and testifies to its use for business purposes,
Newi would force IRS to grant the deduction unless it could prove
that the office did not contribute to the taxpayer's convenience or
efficiency.
Alhough home office expense may not be as large as other deductions for the average taxpayer, its increased availability should encourage more taxpayers to itemize."4 Widespread use of itemized deductions would increase both the complexity of returns and the cost of
handling them.6" When coupled with the increased cost of enforcement
under the Newi rule, these expenses could prove significant. The dimensions of this potential rise in cost are accentuated by the fact that over
eighty per cent of all taxpayers are employees heretofore subjected to the
restrictive "condition of employment" test.6"
64. Employee business deductions represent the fifth largest class of itemized

deductions. IRS,

STATISTICS OF INCOME-1969,

INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS

370

(971). Thus, the home office deduction may have a "tipping effect," encouraging
itemization. The home office cases demonstrate that the amounts involved are not
insignificant: Newi allowed over $700, Bischoff $700 and Peiss over $300.
65. As our country's population and economy grow, the Service's workload
also increases. Our operations are a direct reflection of that growth. We
-mustkeep up.

One measure of the Service's work is the total number of tax
returns filed, but this factor considered alone can be misleading. Although

the Tax Reform Act of 1969 is estimated to eliminate the filing of 5.6 million
low income returns in 1971 the increase in the number of complex returns
and additional complexity introduced by the Tax Reform Act will increase
our workload. The increasing complexity of returns produces obvious and
also subtle demands that make tax administration more difficult and costly.
Hearings on 1971 Treasury Appropriations before the Subcomm. on Departments
of Treamry and Post Office and Executie Office Appropriations of the House
Appropriations Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 693-94 (1970) (statement of
former Commissioner Randolph W. Thrower) (emphasis in original). Since 1944,
efficient administration of the federal income tax system has depended upon widespread
use of the standard deduction. Thus, it is a matter of grave alarm for IRS that since
1944 the percentage of tax returns claiming the standard deduction has declined steadily
from over eighty per cent in 1944 to just over fifty per cent in 1969. See IRS,
STATISTICS OF INcoME, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAx RETURNS, for the years 1944 through
1969.
66. Since 1937 returns reporting salaries and wages have composed over eighty
per cent of all returns. See IRS, STATISTICS OF INCOME, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
RETURNS, for the years 1937 through 1969. The general trend has been towards an
increase in this figure. In 1969 (the last year for which figures are available), the
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17. COMMISSIONER

These arguments represent legitimate concerns. The fears may be
somewhat premature because recent cases appear to apply a general
reasonableness limitation to the "appropriate and helpful" test; the
deduction is allowed only if it is reasonable for the employee to perform
his tasks at home." This would indicate that Newi is not a carte blanche
grant of the deduction to all employees and, therefore, should not inconvenience tax administration to the extent feared by IRS.
This reasonableness test has presented the Tax Court with an
opportunity to recognize several important policies. In addition to a
general policy in favor of employee free choice, the court has displayed a
willingness to interpret § 162 to serve policies such as employee convenience, efficiency and productivity.68 In addition, at least one recent
case indicates that concern for the taxpayer's safety may play an important
role in satisfying the "appropriate and helpful" test in the future.6 9
While these considerations are not alone sufficient to outweigh the
need for efficient tax administration, there remains an overriding policy
figure reached 90.8 per cent. Id. for 1969, at 4 (1971). Approximately ninety per cent
of all returns with itemized deductions in 1969 reported salaries and wages. Id. at 87.
None of these figures should be taken as a prediction that eighty per cent of all
returns will now claim the home office deduction. A more telling figure in terms of
the home office deduction is the more than two million public elementary and
secondary school teachers (previously denied the deduction). HEW, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 37 (1970). It may well be that this group more than any other will
benefit from the liberalized home office deduction. See note 68 infra.
67. James L. Denison, P-H TAX CT. REI. & MEm. DEC. ff 71,249 (Sept. 28, 1971) ;
Christopher A. Rafferty, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEal. DEC. 1171,202 (Aug. 18, 1971);
Marvin L. Dietrich, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEm. DEc. ff 71,159 (July 6, 1971); Stanley
E. Bailey, P-H TAX CT. REP. & M... DEC. 1 71,107 (May 17, 1971).
68. In May, 1971, the court allowed the deduction to a pilot who used his
home to store flight records and hold occasional union meetings (when it was inconvenient to meet at the union hall). Stanley E. Bailey, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM.
DEc. ff 71,107 (May 17, 1971). In July, 1971, Newi was cited as controlling in Marvin
L. Dietrich, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEa. DEC., 1171,159 (July 6, 1971). A resident
physician and his wife were allowed the deduction for a room in which to read
journals, prepare lectures and grade papers. Although Dietrich had access to study
facilities at the hospital library (Record at 60, 61; Respondent's Brief at 16, 55, 56,
58), he worked at home because it was "easier" and more "efficient" to do so. Record
at 30, 61. In August and September, 1971, two small claims decisions relied on Newi
to allow the deduction to employees who failed to satisfy the "condition of employment"
test. Christopher A. Rafferty, P-H TAX CT. REP. & M.m. DEc. 1171,202 (Aug. 18,
1971); James L. Denison, P-H TAX CT. Rm,. & MEm. DEC. 1 71,249 (Sept. 28, 1971).
In Rafferty, an aerospace engineer was allowed the deduction although he had
been provided an office. In Denison, two school teachers were allowed the deduction
even though other teachers were able to complete similar tasks at the school during
their free hour. The court reasoned that "the method of presentation, the material
to be corrected, and the sincere desire to teach the subject well, distinguishes [taxpayer]
from his fellow teachers." P-H TAX CT. REP. & M=.. DE. 1171,249, at 71-1133. In
November, 1971, a college professor was allowed the deduction under Rev. Rul. 64-272.
Bruce B. Steimnann, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEm. DEC. 1171,295 (Nov. 22, 1971).
69. James L. Denison, P-H TAX CT. RP. & MEM. DEC. 1171,249, at 71-1133
(Sept. 28, 1971)
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supporting Newi's liberalization of the home office deduction-the uniformly recognized income tax principle of horizontal equity. This principle
has been described as follows:
Equity in taxation is that aspect of tax fairness that is
concerned with similarities among taxpayers. Equity is achieved
when persons and businesses in a similar economic position
are taxed the same. Tax equity is one of the applications of a
broader idea that taxes to be fair should be neutral-that is,
they should not change the relative positions of taxpayers.7
It is not the province of courts to strike down expressly discriminatory
language of the Code unless the discrimination amounts to a denial of
constitutional rights. 7 ' However, where the Code does not expressly
discriminate (as in § 162) courts are obligated to examine critically
any interpretations which do so. 2 Self-employed taxpayers have been
allowed the home office deduction without limitations comparable to the
"condition of employment" test. This discriminatory treatment of
employees as a taxpayer class is without convincing justification.73 Newi
correctly applies the principle that like cases demand like results. Thus,
on balance Newi was justified in eradicating a long-standing discrimination against employees.
PETER M. KELLY II
BLOUGH, THE FEDERAL TAXING PROCEss 387-88 (1952).
Ethical principles are significant because they influence the character of
the tax and fiscal system in terms of its objectives and functions . . .

70. R.

[E]thics in taxation involves the criteria of fiscal justice ...
The essence to tax justice lies in the principle to tax neutrality, and may
be referred to as the issue of uniformity versus selectivity or discrimination.
Stout, Ethics in Federal Taxation, 41 TAXES 44, 45 (1963). See also R. MAGILL, THE
IMPACT OF FEDERAL TAXES 7 et seq. (1943).
71. None would dispute that a taxing measure may indeed be found unconstitutional, but as Judge Learned Hand observed, the "mere inequality of
incidence has never been held enough." . . . Unconstitutionality derives neither
from unequal imposition nor from unequal incidence, but rather from that
special instance where the act is "so arbitrary as to compel the conclusion
that it does not involve an exertion of the taxing power, but constitutes, in
substance and effect, the direct exertion of a different and forbidden power,
as, for example, the confiscation of property. .. ."
Lionberger v. United States, 371 F.2d 831, 837 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 844
(1967) (citations omitted).
72. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
73. The job needs of many employees seem as convincing as those of self-employed
persons. The old rule was unsound because it failed to examine the substance of the
taxpayer's need for the home office in each case. By rejecting the "condition of
employment" test the Tax Court has recognized that not every self-employed taxpayer
needs an office and that employees sometimes do need offices. In thus focusing on
the nature of the taxpayer's job and not on his status as an employee, the court has
given recognition to the interests of individual taxpayers.

